Chinese acquirers spent $38 million on mergers and acquisitions in 1990, and $666.1 billion on mergers and acquisitions in 2016. As the Chinese merger market has grown, so too has the literature on its performance. Little is known, however, with whom the Chinese can best do business. We aim to fill this gap. We suggest that because the liabilities of 'distance' 'foreignness' and 'outsideness' complicate acquisition performance, targets in countries and regions which add fewer of these liabilities will outperform those that add more. We test this using a sample of 19,766 large (>$10m) acquisitions (Jan 1990-Aug 2017, and a sub-sample of 1,542 acquisition for which we could calculate performance. We then plot the overseas expansion of Chinese acquirers, and compare the performance of Chinese acquisitions, within the Greater China region, within the Confucian cultural sphere, and between Asian and the West. In each case, we predict that increasing cultural distance decreases performance. Then, because the Continental European governance system is institutionally more familiar to the Chinese system than it is to the Anglo-Saxon system, we consider the Chinese experience in each of these two systems. Our results largely support our hypotheses, but we also point to the limits of the generalizability of existing literature in understanding the Chinese market.
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese market for mergers and acquisitions is booming 1 ; in 1990, Chinese acquirers spent $38 million on mergers and acquisitions, and in 2016 they spent $661.3 billion.
As the Chinese merger market has grown, so too has the literature on the performance of Chinese mergers and acquisitions (e.g., Peng et al., 1999; Cooke, 2006; Peng, 2006; Xia et al., 2008; Yang et al., 2011) . A number of scholars have looked at the performance of Chinese overseas acquisitions (e.g., Boateng et al., 2008; but none, to the best of our knowledge, have considered how the location of the target impacts performance. In other words, little is known if Chinese acquirers can work better with American, European or Asian targets. The purpose of this paper is to address this gap.
We propose a hierarchy of targets in terms of location and performance expectation. Based on the suggestion that international deals are more costly than domestic deals --because of the liabilities of 'distance' (Boeh and Beamish, 2012) , 'foreignness' (Zaheer, 1995) and 'outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) -and the observation that cultural and institutional differences vary, we propose the following ordering of international targets.
First, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions, outside of mainland China, but within the Greater China Region -that is, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan -will outperform those outside the region, because acquisitions within the region will present fewer geographic and cultural challenges, and the same institutional challenges that Chinese acquirers will face anywhere outside of China. Second, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside of the Greater China
Region, but within the Confucian world -that is, Japan, Korea and Vietnam -will outperform those outside because all the countries in this region share a common Confucian foundation (Miles and Goo, 2013) , and a social systems that emphasize 'harmony' (Alston, 1989) and 'reciprocity' (Lovett et al., 1999; Chung and Hamilton, 2001 ). Outside of the Greater China region, in other words, Confucian targets are the next most familiar. Third, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside the Confucian world, but still within Asia will outperform those in the West, because Asian cultures are more similar to each other -in terms of their collectivist and long-term tendencies -than they are to Western cultureswhich tend to be short-term focused and individualistic (Hofstede, 1984; . Asian target, in other words, will be more familiar to Chinese acquirers and therefore perform better. Finally, we suggest that, in the West, 'Continental European' targets will outperform 'Anglo-Saxon targets', because while the cultural and geographic distances are high in the case of all Western targets, the governance literature (Weimer and Pape, 1999; Cernat, 2004; Mueller, 2006) suggests that the Chinese corporate governance system is more similar to the Continental European system -employed throughout continental Europe -than it is to the Anglo-Saxon -employed in the English-speaking world (Miles and Goo, 2008) . Continental targets we suggest will be relatively more familiar, institutionally, to Chinese acquirers.
We test this hierarchy of targets using a sample of 19,766 large (>$10m) Chinese acquisitions, announced in the period Jan 1990 -August 2017, and a sub-sample of all 1,542
acquisitions by stock-listed acquirers, for which we could measure performance.
We show that the average Chinese deal adds 3.23% to the market value of the acquiring firm, and that almost 60% of Chinese acquisitions in the sample created value. This is surprising,
given that studies using Western samples usually report that 65-85% of mergers and acquisitions fail (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2012) . We show that most Chinese acquisitions from 'reductions in the cost of capital', and collusive synergies are the gains that come from 'increased market power' (Chatterjee, 1986, p.121) . Subsequent researchers have refined this basic model (see e.g., Krishnan et al., 2007; Devos et al., 2008) ; Houston et al. (2001) , for example, splits operative synergies into 'expansionary' synergies, which are the gains that come from an expansion into a new product or regions, and 'cost-cutting' synergies, which are the gains that come from acquisitions which reduce the acquirers (average) costs. And to this model, resource-based scholars have added the gains that come with controlling 'strategic assets' -such as natural, technological, financial, and human resources (e.g., Chen, 2008 ) --and international business scholars have made use of Dunning's (1980 Dunning's ( , 1988 Dunning's ( , 1993 OLI paradigm, to suggest that foreign acquisitions may also be motivated by 'market seeking' gains -which come with access to foreign markets, and the potential that they offer for the export of domestic products and for an increase in sales (e.g., Buckley et al., 2007) 2 .
The Dangers of Mergers and Acquisitions
The empirical reality of mergers and acquisitions is, however, somewhat different. After 100 years of research on 'the M&A markets of the USA and UK' (Moschieri and Campa, 2009, p 72) , the impact of a merger on the performance of the acquiring firm is said to be, at best, "inconclusive" (Haspeslagh and Jemison, 1991, p.59) , and is thought, at worst, to be "systematic[ally] detrimental" (Dickerson et al., 1997, p.359 ). Many mergers are described as failures: Puranam and Singh (1999) suggest that between 65 and 85% of all mergers and acquisitions fail, and that as many as 50-65% are divested within 5 years, and Houston et al., (2001) estimate that only about 60% of predicted cost-cutting synergies, and only about 7% of predicted of revenue-expanding synergies are ever realised. Huge sums of money are lost in the process, and huge amounts of shareholder value destroyed. , for example, estimates that shareholders lost '$216 billion' in the 1990s on mergers and acquisitions (p.758), and concluded that shareholder would 'have been better off if management had simply burned the cash used to pay for the acquisition' (p.765).
A large literature suggests that cross-border deals are a particularly troublesome subset of mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Chatterjee and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Sarkissian and Schill, 2008; Gozzi et al., 2008) . This literature argues that while any merger might be subject to 'unforeseen and insurmountable challenges' (Child et al., 2001) , international dealmakers add the liabilities of 'distance' (Boeh and Beamish, 2012) , 'foreignness' (Zaheer, 1995) and 'outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) to the performance equation.
Broadly speaking, the 'liability of distance' is the costs associated with doing business 'far away': distance increases transportation (Capron et al., 1998) and monitoring costs (Böckerman and Lehto, 2003) , obstructs the flow of information and increases information asymmetries (Coval and Moskowitz 1999), and it reduces market power (Levy and Reitzes, 1992 ) and access to soft information (Hauptman and Hirji 1999) . Distance is present, to a varying degree, in most mergers and acquisitions. The liabilities of 'foreignness' (Zaheer, 1995) and 'outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) , however, are two specific sets of costs associated with cross-border deals. These are the liabilities that come with doing business 'abroad'; the former can be thought of as the costs of learning a new set of rules -both in a cultural and institutional sense -and the latter can be thought of as the cost of associated with a developing a new network position in a foreign market (Qian et al., 2013; Bell et al., 2012; Zaheer, 2002) . Both liabilities increase transaction costs, complicate communication (Kaurent, 1983; Chevrier, 2003) , reduces the quality of the information transferred (Jaffe et al., 1993; Kim, 2009) , create uncertainty (Reus and Lamont, 2009) , and leads to situations of 'them and us' (Huntington, 1993) which, in turn, increases employee turnover (Krug and Hegarty, 1997), and both liabilities have been linked to sub-par cross-border performance.
The Chinese Merger Market
It is well known that Chinese merger market has grown rapidly in recent years. It is also wellknown that as it grew the Chinese merger market quickly internationalised (see e.g., MOC, 2006; Athreye and Kapur, 2009; UNCTAD, 2011; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013 ' (Lin et al., 2009 ' (Lin et al., , p.1114 , and that empirical research on the Chinese merger market only started in the late 1990s (see e.g., Peng et al., 1999) . Writing in 2011, Yang et al (2011) counts "a total of six previous papers
[that] deal with M&As in China Cooke, 2006; Lin et al., 2009; Peng, 2006; Peng et al., 1999; Xia et al., 2008) , [only] three of which use rigorous quantitative methods Lin et al., 2009; Xia et al., 2008 )" (p.241).
Because of this, there are significant gaps in our understanding of the way in which the Chinese merger market operates, and there is a need for comparative studies (Earley, 1989; Tsui et al., 2007; Li and Peng, 2008; Peng and Heath, 1996) , 'in order to test or generalize Western findings ' Yang et al (2011, p241) . Unfortunately, however, such attempted still remain relatively rare (Lu et al., 2008; Lin et al., 2011; Nicholson and Salaber, 2013) .
The Partner Location Performance Hierarchy
This paper adds to this gap in our understanding, by considering, effectively, the applicability of the literature on cross-border mergers and acquisitions to Chinese acquirers. We reason that if differences in language, regulation, currencies, culture and legal systems complicate the performance of an international acquisition, and predict superior performance for domestic deals, then international deals which alter fewer of these variables will outperform those that alter more variables. This reasoning leads us to predict a performance ordering of the overseas targets, which we refer to as the partner location performance hierarchy. Table 1 presents an overview of this hierarchy. The intuition behind it is explained below.
--Insert Table 1 Here -
HYPOTHESES
A rich literature suggests that domestic deals should outperform international deals.
Theoretically, international deal makers incur the liabilities of 'distance' (Boeh and Beamish, 2012) , 'foreignness' (Zaheer, 1995) and 'outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002) , and empirically a large literature suggests that cross-border deals underperform (e.g. Chatterjee and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Levine and Schmukler, 2006; Sarkissian and Schill, 2008; Gozzi et al., 2008 ). Because we have no reason to suggest that Chinese acquirers are any more astute at dealing with these liabilities, we suggest that the existing literature applies. Thus:
H1 -Domestic Chinese deals will outperform international Chinese deals
Domestic deals are to be preferred, therefore, to international deals. But, clearly, not all international deals are equally as troublesome. If the liabilities of distance, foreignness and outsideness complicate cross-border mergers and acquisitions (Kogut and Singh, 1998), then clearly deals which incur fewer of these liabilities will outperform those that incur more. This reasoning leads to a hierarchy of international destinations. Firstly, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside of China, but within the Greater China Region -that is, Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan -will outperform those outside of the region. Acquisitions within the region, we argue, present Chinese acquirers with fewer geographic and cultural challenges, and the same level of institutional challenges than they will face anywhere outside of Mainland China; an acquisition in capitalist Hong Kong presents the same institutional challenges, we suggest, to a Chinese acquirer as an acquisition in the US or UK. Thus:
H2 -Deals in the Greater China region will outperform deals outside the region
Secondly, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside the Greater China Region, but within the so-called Confucian cultural sphere -that is, Japan, Korea and Vietnam -will outperform those outside that sphere. Acquisitions within that world, we suggest, will present fewer cultural challenges, because all the countries in that world are built upon a 'Confucian'
foundation (Miles and Goo, 2013) , and share a social systems that emphasize 'harmony' -epitomized by the Japanese concept of wa (和) -at the group-level (Alston, 1989) , and 'relationships' -epitomised by the Chinese concept of guanxi (关系) -at the individual level (Lovett et al., 1999; Chung and Hamilton, 2001; Hitt et al., 2002) . Outside of the Greater China region, in other words, Confucian targets are the next most familiar. Thus:
H3 -Deals in the Confucian Region will outperform non-Confucian deals
Next, we suggest that Chinese acquisitions outside of the Confucian cultural sphere, but within Asia, will outperform those outside of Asia. Asian targets, we reason, will present fewer cultural challenges to Chinese acquirers, because Asian cultures are more similar to each other -in their tendencies towards collectivist and long-term orientated -than they are to Western cultures -which are short-term focused and individualistic (Hofstede, 1984; . Asian targets, we suggest, therefore, will be more familiar to Chinese acquirers and will be more likely, therefore, to perform better than Western targets. Thus:
H4 -Asian deals will outperform non-Asian deals
Finally, and looking at the West, we suggest that 'Continental' targets will outperform 'Anglo-Saxon targets', because while the cultural and geographic distances are high in the case of all Western targets, the governance literature (e.g. Weimer and Pape, 1999; Cernat, 2004; Mueller, 2006) suggests that the Chinese corporate governance system is more similar to the Continental European' than it is to the Anglo-Saxon (Miles and Goo, 2008) . In the Anglo-Saxon system -used throughout the English-speaking world -the firm is conceived as an instrument for creating shareholder value (Weimer and Pape, 1999) . Ownership is dispersed and shareholders are atomistic, but all shareholders are equally protected (La Porta et al., 1998) . This, and the fact that the stock market is the stick by which performance is gauged, and the stick by which managers are compensated, makes shareholder the most significant stakeholders in the Anglo-Saxon system. By contrast, in the Continental systemused throughout continental Europe -the firm is considered to be a coalition of various participants, all of whom strive for the continuity of the firm as a whole (Moerland, 1995) .
Ownership is concentrated, often in a single family, and employees and debt providers are given a significant say in the ways in which the firm is run. This means that shareholders are important in the Continental systems, but not more important than any of the other stakeholders. Because of this, Continentals firms tend to be focused on stability and continuity, while Anglo-Saxon firms tend to be focused on the creation of short terms gains, and on the distribution of those gains to shareholders (Gelauff and Den Broeder, 1996) .
For Chinese acquirers the latter system -the Continental system -is likely to be more familiar. In the Chinese system the purpose of the firm is to create an inheritance (Miles and Goo, 2013) . Ownership tends to be concentrated (Claessens et al., 2000; Carney, et al., 2011) , often in the hands of a single family, and there is a high degree of overlap between ownership and management in most Chinese firms (Ahlstromet al., 2010; Heugens et al., 2009; Liu et al., 2011; Peng and Jiang, 2010; Schulze and Gedajlovic, 2010; Zhang and Ma, 2009 ). The similarity between Chinese and Continental firms on one hand, and the lack of familiarity of Chinese acquirers with the stock market, on the other (Bosiot and Child, 1996; Keister, 1998 Keister, , 2009 Li et al., 2008; Yiu et al., 2007; Rui and Yip, 2008; Naughton, 2002) , which is all important in the Anglo-Saxon world, leads us to suggest that Continental targets will present
Chinese acquirers with fewer challenges than Anglo-Saxon targets. Thus:
H5 -Continental deals will outperform Anglo-Saxon targets

METHODS
Sample
We test these hypotheses using a data from the Thomson Reuters SDC. We refine it to include all deals: (1) announced between Jan 01, 1990 and July 31, 2017; (2) with transaction values above US$10 million. We only include deals: (3) for 100% of the target firm's shares; and (4) deals which do not involve recapitalization, a repurchase of own shares, or a spin-off to existing shareholders. Doing so, we create an initial sample of 19,766 acquisitions.
Target Location
Using the location of the firm, we program a number of indicator variables.
First, and to test the first hypothesis -which suggests that domestic Chinese acquisitions will outperform international Chinese acquisition -we create: (1) 
Deal Performance
Following the majority of merger performance studies (see Zollo and Miere, 2008 for an excellent review), we calculate performance using an event study methodology.
In an event study, a pre-event 'estimation window' is defined, and historical data is used to forecast the firms 'normal' stock price at a future date; this is an expectation of how the firm's stock should have been priced, had the event not occurred. Comparing this 'forecast'
with 'actual' data on the firm's stock price, after the event, provides an indicator of the firms 'abnormal' return; this is the change in the firm's value, above or below the firm's expected value, which is attributable to the event. Summing the abnormal returns over a period of time, known as an 'event window', leads to an expression as 'cumulative abnormal returns'.
Algebraically, the abnormal return is calculated by identifying the difference between the actual returns and normal returns of the acquiring firms. Abnormal return of a security i;
Where R i,t is the actual return and E[R i,t ] is the estimated or normal return to the acquiring firm. In equation (2) is displayed how the normal return is calculated;
Where α i is the intercept coefficient, β i is the slope, R m,t the formation of the used benchmarks, and ε i,t is expected to be equal to 0. Summing the abnormal returns to the firm, within a predefined event window, produces cumulative abnormal returns:
We calculate cumulative abnormal returns to the acquiring firm using the standard 250 day estimation window --measured from 295 days before each event to 45 days before it [-295, - 45] -and the standard one [-1,+1] and five day event window [-5,+1] . We follow the precedence of measuring CARs before the announcement to include pre-bid run-ups (Schwert, 1996) and afterwards to observe the effect of the event. If a merger was announced on a non-trading day, we code the subsequent trading day as the official announcement day.
We retrieve the stock-market data necessary to complete an event study using Datastream.
Data availability, at this point, reduces the sample of available deals to 1,542 deals.
Performance Controls
A number of factors are known to impact deal performance (see King et al., for a review).
We control for: (1) the percent of the deal financed by cash (Percent Cash) and stock (Percent Stock) because Heron and Lie (2002) shows that cash-financed deals outperform stock-financed deals; (2) Acquirer Size, measured in thousands of employees, because Moeller et al (2004) show that larger acquirers make worse deals; (3) the Deal Size, because Moeller et al (2004) show that larger deals perform poorly. All the necessary data is collected from DataStream, and / or the SDC. We test each of the control variables for normality, and employ logs of all variables that fail the test. --Insert Table 2 Here -
Estimation
We consider the impact of partner location using OLS techniques. In all estimations we cluster, at both the targets and acquiring industry, according to Froot (1989) and Wooldridge (2002), using both firms Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes, to allow for industry effects. We also include year dummies, to account for year specific effects. We also adjust all standard errors for heteroskedasticity, using the Huber (1967) and White (1980) sandwich estimator of variance. Finally, and before interpreting the results, we confirm that multicollinearity is not an issue, using a variance inflation factor (VIF) test (Hair et al., 1992) .
RESULTS
The Chinese Merger Market
Figures 1, 2 and Table 3 report the growth and shape of the Chinese merger market. Figure 1 illustrates the near exponential nature of the growth in the Chinese merger market; from 2 deals in 1990, worth $38 million, to 3,261 deals in 2016, worth $661.3 billion. Figure 2 provides a breakdown in the composition of the Chinese merger market. It reports that, despite the huge growth in the market, the willingness of the Chinese to internationalise 3 Winzoring is a technique for dealing with the effects of possibly spurious outliers. By winzoring between 0.01% and 99.99%, we set all data below the 0.01th percentile equal to the 0.01th percentile, and all data above the 99.99th percentile equal to the 99.99th percentile. The estimators that this creates are more robust to outliers, and by winzorising the data, we can make use of the full set. remains low; in total, 91.4% of Chinese deals are domestic. Table 3 Here -
Partner Types and Performance
Models 1-6, in Table 4 , reports on how the choice of partner impacts performance. We report results using the [-5,+1] --Insert Table 4 Here --Next, Models 5-7 consider the specifics of Chinese acquisitions in the West, to test the hypothesis that Chinese acquirers will be able to create more value with targets based in Continental European governance systems, than targets in the Anglo-Saxon system. Model 5
shows that Chinese Anglo-Saxon acquisitions destroy value, and Model 6 shows that Chinese
Continental European acquisitions neither create value. Model 7 confirms these effects, when both indicators are included, and thus supports the suggestion that Chinese acquirers can do better deals in the Continental governance system than the Anglo-Saxon system.
DISCUSSION
Main Findings
A number of the findings we presented above fit with our expectations / predictions, but a number of our other findings require some additional consideration. Our results suggest:
(
1) The Chinese merger market is booming and creating value
The Chinese made 19,766 large (>$10m) acquisition between Jan 1990 and August 2017, and the growth has been near exponential. In 1990, Chinese acquirers made 2 large mergers and acquisitions; in 2016, they made 3,261 large acquisitions. Looking at the sub-sample for which we could calculate performance, we find that the Chinese are, on average, creating value with their acquisitions. The average Chinese acquisition in the sample added 3.23% to the market value of the acquiring firm, and that almost 60% of Chinese acquisitions in the sample created value; Western samples usually report that 65-85% of acquisitions fail (McCarthy and Dolfsma, 2012) .
(2) We find mixed support for our proposed performance hierarchy A number of our expectations regarding the proposed performance hierarchy were confirmed, but a number of the results were quite unexpected. We found:
a. Domestic deals outperform international deals
We expected and found that domestic deals outperformed international deals.
The majority of Chinese acquisitions (91%) are domestic, and the evidence shows that domestic acquisitions create value; on average, domestic acquirers add +2.6% to the market value of the firm. This finding fits with the wider literature, which shows that domestic deals perform better (Chatterjee and Aw, 2000; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; .
b. Acquisitions in the Greater China Region destroy value
We expected that acquisitions in the Greater China region would be the next best thing to a domestic acquisition, but we find that these acquisitions actually destroy value. Understanding why requires additional research. It might be, however, that targets within the Greater China region are not sufficiently different to those on Mainland China to justify incurring the costs that come with the liability of distance, foreignness and outsidedness.
c. Confucian and Asian Targets add value
We expected and found that both Confucian and Asian targets would add value to Chinese acquirers. Out results suggest that the average Confucian target adds 9.8% to the value of the market value of the acquiring Chinese firm. This seems to suggest that Chinese acquirers which step outside of the Greater China region, but remain within the Confucian world, add the most value. By contrast, Chinese acquisitions outside of the Confucian world, but within Asia, add value, but only add 1.3% to the acquirer, on average.
Confucian targets, in other words, seems to be sufficiently different to justify internationalisation, but sufficiently similar to be easily integrated.
d. Anglo-Saxon targets perform badly, and Continental targets are unspectacular
Lastly, we expected that when cultural and geographic distances were equally high, Western targets with lower institutional hurdles would not only be preferred, but would demonstrate superior performance. We somewhat support this suggestion. Chinese acquisitions of Anglo-Saxon targets destroy value; the average Anglo-Saxon acquisition reduces the value of the acquiring firm by 3.1%. Chinese Continental European acquisitions perform better, but they neither create nor destroy value. We thus support the hypothesis, but find that while the Chinese do the worst with Anglo-Saxon targets, they don't do much better with Continental European targets.
Together, these findings provide support for only parts of the proposed performance hierarchy. Our failure to support the entire hierarchy supports the suggestion that China is 'different ' (Lin et al., 2009) , and that Chinese mergers and acquisitions are significantly different (Peng and Heath, 1996) , insofar as the expectations derived from the literature, typically based upon the study of US acquirers (e.g., Hitt et al., 2001; Moschieri and Campa, 2009) , is not fully generalizable to Chinese firms. We support the calls, therefore, for additional comparative research (e.g., Lin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011; Nicolson and Salaber, 2013) to further test or to generalise Western findings, and to develop theories for emerging economies (Earley, 1989; Tsui, 2007) .
Limitations
Our findings are subject to a number of important limitations. Firstly, we only consider large acquisitions, which we define to mean greater than $10 million. Such a restriction is put in place because smaller deals are known to perform differently (see e.g., Weitzel and McCarthy, 2011) , and because the convention in the merger literature is to implement a minimum restriction. In doing so, however, the generalizability of our results becomes unclear. Secondly, we do not consider the underlying motives behind the merger, which other have suggested are critical to understanding merger performance (Shrivastave, 1986; Bower, 2001; Javidan et al., 2004; Schweizer, 2005) . It may be, however, that Asian targets outperform Western targets, not because of cultural similarities and differences, but because there are more cost-cutting acquisition in Asian, and more revenue-expanding acquisition in the West. Additional research is required, we suggest, to investigate this possibility.
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper was to document the emergence of the Chinese merger market, and to consider how the choice of partner -in terms of physical location -impacts performance.
Building upon a theoretical literature which suggest that international deals are more costlyin terms of the liabilities of 'distance' (Boeh and Beamish, 2012) , 'foreignness' (Zaheer, 1995) and 'outsideness´ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2002 ) -we argued, firstly, that domestic Chinese acquisitions will outperform international deals and, secondly, that those international deals which incurred more of these liabilities would underperform those that incurred less. Effectively, therefore, the aim of this paper was to answer the calls of scholars looking to test the generalizability of the existing literature to emerging market firms (e.g., Earley, 1989; Tsui, 2007; Lin et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2011; Nicolson and Salaber, 2013 ).
Our results demonstrate that: (1) unlike Western firms, Chinese acquirers are creating value through mergers and acquisitions; (2) the literature only imperfectly applies to Chinese acquirers. We find that in most cases the performance of Chinese overseas acquisitions support the proposed performance hierarchy, but certainly not in all cases. Our failure to support the entire hierarchy supports the suggestion that China is 'different ' (Lin et al., 2009; Peng and Heath, 1996) , and that the existing literature is not fully generalizable. In doing so, we create a number of rich research opportunities for scholars looking to dig deeper into the largely unexplored field of linking Western literature to Chinese mergers and acquisitions. 
